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1. Summary 
 
In his (2020) OSSA paper “Presumptions, burdens of proof, and explanations,” Petar Bodlović 
“deal[s] with the allocation question [—how should the burden of proof be allocated in 
argumentative discourse—] in those situations where it is a presumption that is challenged, 
rejected, or contradicted” (1; emphasis added).  
Under a symmetrical allocation of the burden of proof [BofP], as Bodlović explains things, 
“there are neither privileged parties not privileged standpoints” (1). Rather, each arguer bears the 
BofP to answer doubts, objections, challenges, etc. for each assertion they make. Proponents are 
obliged to answer an interlocutor’s doubts to their contentions in dialectically adequate ways (i.e., 
ways that meet with their interlocutor’s acceptance) in order to secure their interlocutor’s 
endorsement (i.e., acceptance) of their standpoint(s). Under asymmetrical allocations of the BofP, 
Bodlović tells us, “some propositions are dialectically privileged”(2). “Once these propositions get 
challenged,” he continues, “they do not require support until or unless the opponent presents 
(sufficient) reasons against their acceptability” (2). Bodlović calls such dialectically privileged 
claims “presumptions,” in recognition of their “reversed” BofP. This “reversal” of the BofP 
Bodlović calls the deontic function common to all presumptions: “all presumptions share the same 
deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof” (3).  
Bodlović considers what he calls the standard account of the deontic function of 
presumptions, which he characterizes as follows: 
 
If the proponent P puts forward p (that in the context at hand has the status of a 
presumption) in turn t1, and the opponent O rejects or challenges p in turn t2, then P does 
not carry the burden of proof in t3 whereas O incurs the burden of proof in t2+n. (9) 
 
In this context, Bodlović (9) considers a dialogue of the following form: 
 
(I)   (t1) P: Presumably, p. 
       (t2) O: Reject: “Presumably, p.” 
       (t3) ? 
       (t4) ? 
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and asks whether the BofP shifted to O by the P’s presumption at (I1) is unconditional, occurring 
at (I3) with no additional move required by P, or whether it is conditional, contingently occurring 
only at (I4) depending on whether P, at (I3), requests reasons of O for his rejection of the 
presumption that p made by P in (I1). First, then, is when—i.e., under what conditions—the deontic 
function of presumptions is activated.  
Second, is the question of what O must do to fulfil the burden imposed by a presumption. 
In approaching this question, Bodlović distinguishes between cognitive presumptions (which have 
a dialectically privileged epistemic status) and practical presumptions (which have a dialectically 
privileged status in practical, deliberative reasoning). He further distinguishes three kinds of 
burdens: (i) a burden of arguing, (ii) a burden of explanation, and (iii) a more general burden of 
reasoning. These he defines respectively as follows: 
 
THE BURDEN OF REASONING (BoR) is the party’s dialogical obligation to provide a reason 
for a position (view). (10) 
 
THE BURDEN OF ARGUING (BoA) is the party’s dialogical obligation to provide an 
argumentative reason [i.e., a reason “that the other party, ideally, has already conceded … 
or will most likely concede” (11)] for a position (view). (11)  
 
THE BURDEN OF EXPLANATION (BoE) is the party’s dialogical obligation to provide an 
explanatory reason for a position (view). (12) 
 
The main thesis of Bodlović’s paper is that cognitive and practical presumptions may be 
distinguished according to the kind of probative burdens they allocate to objectors of the 
presumptions. In his own words, Bodlović’s position is roughly this: 
 
First, … presumption, taken in the abstract sense, does not place the burden of proof on the 
opponent, but rather the burden of reasoning. … Second, … cognitive and practical 
presumptions distribute different dialectical obligations. To be sure, they both place the 
burden of reasoning on the opponent, but whereas cognitive presumptions require either 
arguments or explanations, practical presumptions seem to require arguments. Thus, at the 
level of a concrete dialogical implementation, the deontic analogy (deontic uniqueness), 
proposed by standard accounts, does not hold. Presumptions have distinct deontic 
functions. (Bodlović 2020: 18-19)  
 
2. Analysis 
 
Starting from characterizations of the BofP as an obligation to support one’s view with reasons, 
Bodlović claims that “one may interpret the burden of proof in such a way as that it says no more 
than that there is an obligation to provide reasons, of whatever kind” (10). Thus, if the BofP shifted 
to an opponent by a presumption is the BofR, one must merely give a reason in support of one’s 
declining the presumption. According to Bodlović, though, this will not do. According to Bodlović 
the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions make it more “analytically useful” 
to “adopt a more specific conception of the burden of proof” typically adopted by philosophers 
and argumentation theorists (10). 
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As distinct from the BofR, Bodlović claims, is the BofA—the burden of providing 
“argumentative” reasons. The distinguishing feature here seems to be that “argumentative” reasons 
are reasons that are offered in an attempt to persuade an interlocutor. As such, they must be 
dialectically acceptable—reasons that one’s interlocutor would countenance.  
Lastly, as distinct from reasons that an interlocutor would countenance, are reasons that 
they wouldn’t—even reasons that we would not expect them to accept. On Bodlović’s account, 
such reasons can still serve an explanatory function in dialogue and can help to advance the 
argumentative discussion towards a resolution by helping a proponent to understand an opponent’s 
reasons for declining commitment and thereby to better know which reasons might best be offered. 
To introduce the idea of explanatory reasons, Bodlović considers the case of round-Earther 
Diane and flat-Earther Steve who are arguing over the shape of the Earth. According to Bodlović 
“In the ordinary context, ‘The Earth is round’ is a (strong) cognitive presumption” (6).  
 
Many reliable epistemic sources vouch for it [in a footnote Bodlović here cites “scientific 
authority, evidence, testimonies, and explanatory utility”], and this fact requires dialectal 
recognition: in epistemic dialogue, the proponent of a plausible standpoint and the 
proponent of an implausible standpoint should not play by the same rules. Granted, the 
dialectical rules should not require an immediate acceptance of the most plausible 
standpoint, but they, also, should not force us to proceed as if, initially, all propositions are 
equally plausible. Epistemic dialogues must avoid both uncritical dogmatism and naïve 
egalitarianism… (6) 
 
We may then consider the following instance of Dialogue I, “Flat Earth”: 
 
(FE)  (t1)  Diane: Presumably, the Earth is round. 
(t2)  Steve:  Reject: “Presumably, the Earth is round.” 
 
Of Steve’s move (FEt2), Bodlović asks after the ways that Diane might seek reasons for Steve’s 
rejection of her presumption at (FEt1). He writes: 
 
If Steve rejects a proposition that, in normal circumstances, everyone in a right mind 
concedes, if the well-known and overwhelming evidence is insufficient to persuade him 
that the Earth is round, then what kind of reason can convince Steve of anything regarding 
this matter? Steve has shaken the very foundations of reasonable dialogue without 
providing any guidance on what grounds to continue. Without this kind of guidance, 
Dianne will probably be unable to construct a persuasive argument. (12) 
 
That is, in view of Steve’s astonishing views about the shape of the Earth, Diane’s expectations 
that Steve meet a BofA in rejecting her presumption might be futile. Yet, while she might not 
expect to be persuaded, she might, nevertheless, seek to understand Steve’s reasons for his 
astonishing views, and this understanding might help give Diane guidance as to what reasons she 
might require in answering Steve’s doubts. 
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3. Comments 
 
I take this to be an important point in Bodlović’s paper—one that I would put this way. Inquiry, 
or the search for reasons, Peirce tells us is precipitated by doubt. The function of inquiry is to 
rationally quell doubt. Doubts, when they are our own, are manifest. Just as we believe just those 
things that seem by our lights, to be true (that’s what it is, after all, to believe—to take what we 
believe to be true), we doubt just those things that, it seems to us, are doubtful—i.e., that might, 
possibly, be false.1 That is, the rational merits of our doubts seem manifest to us, just as the alethic 
merits of our beliefs seem manifest to us. So, when reasoning, our doubts not only motivate our 
undertakings of inquiry (inquisitive reasoning), but they can also direct our inquiries—where the 
task of inquiry is understood as rationally answering doubt. By our own lights anyway, we do not 
have unreasonable, or unmotivated, doubts. 
Yet, the situation changes when it comes to reasoning together—i.e., to argumentation. 
There, just as the plausibility of your beliefs, assertions, standpoints, might not be manifest to me, 
neither might the plausibility of your doubts. I might not recognize or appreciate their motivation 
or rationale, and as such I might not understand how they might be assuaged (what it would take 
to answer them). This fact will shape the course of our argumentation. Nevertheless, if I hope to 
get you to endorse my claims, to commit yourself to my standpoint by recognizing my entitlement 
to it, and gaining a position in the space of reasons such that you could claim that same entitlement 
as your own, assuage them I must. 
This leads me to my first question: Bodlović claims that explanatory reasons can be obliged 
when one declines to accept a presumption. Clearly, they are permitted—there is no prohibition, 
in standard “symmetrical” dialectical games, against arguers motivating or explaining their doubts 
of other’s standpoints. And, as Bodlović notes, understanding these reasons can be dialectically 
useful. Moreover, at least as so far as I understand things, requests for these explanatory, non-
persuasive reasons are not prohibited either. That is, in an effort to better understand an opponent’s 
view, arguers may request their opponent to clarify their position or standpoint by disambiguating, 
precisifying, elaborating, and perhaps even motivating it. Yet, what is it about the nature of the 
dialectical privilege that attaches to presumptions that would oblige objectors to provide these 
kinds of explanatory reasons, rather than just permit that they may do so as in ordinary cases where 
non-privileged positions are denied? More generally, when sorting out the origins of those 
discursive entitlements and obligations that attach to presumptions, I suggest that it is worth 
inquiring more generally into the normative sources of our obligations, permissions, and 
prohibitions, as a general understanding of these might better help to inform our prescriptive 
treatment of the odd or exceptional cases, like presumptions. 
As a second point, here’s a suggestion—a recommendation, really—for Bodlović’s larger 
project—a project that I share. When thinking about how presumptions should behave—i.e., how 
we should treat them, what rules we should adopt for their use—after they’ve gotten into 
arguments, it’s worthwhile to consider how they get into arguments in the first place. 
 
1 The strength of our doubts are a function of how the modality “possibly” was how introduced into the discourse. For 
example, things that we deem necessarily, or actually, or probably false, we deem to be possibly false as a 
consequence. If, on the other hand, the possibility is merely “academic”—e.g., while granting that it’s “possible” we 
judge it to be far-fetched, exceptionally unlikely—we might not devote much epistemic labor to ruling it out. 
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In Section 2 of his paper, Bodlović surveys a variety of “common principles of 
asymmetrical allocation” that can be found in the literature. Many of these seek to provide a-priori, 
and non-dialectical criteria for identifying claims deserving of a presumptive status. Criteria such 
as scientific orthodoxy and expert consensus, for example, are offered. 
It is worth remarking that as appealing and commonsensical as these presumptive grounds 
might seem, they are, ultimately, dialectically unsatisfying. For example, in his argument with 
Diane, Steve clearly does not recognize the “many reliable epistemic sources” like “scientific 
authority, evidence, testimonies, and explanatory utility” that vouch for the Earth’s being round as 
the most plausible view about the shape of the Earth. Indeed, his rejecting Diane’s move 
contending the presumption that the Earth is round seems to indicate this. As such, it’s not at all 
clear that “The Earth is round” actually has the status of a presumption in the Flat Earth dialogue. 
Rather, Steve seems to have no commitment to either the claim, or its status as a presumption—as 
the most plausible view. So, it’s not yet clear, at least to me, that Steve actually rejects a 
presumption, rather than Diane’s assertion of the presumptive status of “The Earth is round.” 
Of course, we will presume just those things that seem most plausible to us. The claims 
that we are inclined to dialectically privilege are those that we endorse—those that we judge to be 
correct or well supported by reason. But, it doesn’t follow from their apparent plausibility to us 
that others will similarly find them plausible—or, indeed, that they actually are correct or well 
supported by reason. As such, gesturing to the extra-discursive plausibility of claims as grounds 
for their presumptive status in a dialogue is bound to be dialectically unsuccessful. To use 
Bodlović’s distinction, they might provide us with reasons for the presumptions we make, but they 
won’t be argumentative reasons. 
Dialectically, the presumptive status of a claim amounts to that it is presumed by 
discussants. (That discussants ought to presume some claim requires dialectical work if discussants 
do not accept that obligation.) That discussants take it that a claim does not, for the moment 
anyway, stand in need of reasons is dialectically exhibited by the fact that discussants do not 
demand or offer reasons for it. Once reasons are sincerely demanded of a claim, it would seem that 
any presumptive status it might once have had is lost. Or, to put it more carefully, unless the 
putative grounds for the presumption remain among the elements of the intersection of the 
discussants’ commitment sets (e.g., as identified in the opening stage of a critical discussion) 
pointing to them as grounds for our presumptions will be dialectically unsuccessful. 
One way to understand the asymmetric probative effect of presumptions is that, having 
been established as presumptions, entitlement to them is presumed, and because of this, 
commitment to them is also presumed. As such, it is the entitlement to withdraw, or retract, 
commitment to a presumption that must be demonstrated in a dialectically satisfactory way. And, 
when you think about it that way, that’s not really a dialectically exceptional circumstance. 
Ordinarily, so long as my commitments remain coherent, just as I may take on commitments, I 
may withhold or retract commitment, according to my own best rational lights. 
By contrast, for non-presumptions, it is entitlement to undertake or maintain one’s 
commitments that is called for. Dialectically, the reason for this latter requirement is the 
recognition, or uptake, of one’s commitment that is dialectically sought. In taking on a 
commitment, one is taking oneself to be entitled to that commitment. And, in relying on that 
commitment in argumentation, a proponent seeks her interlocutors’ recognition, or endorsement, 
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of that entitlement. By way of this recognition, she expects her interlocutors to undertake same 
commitment themselves. That is not only why probative burdens fall where they normally do in 
argumentation—on parties seeking recognition and uptake for their standpoints—but also why a 
proponent’s reasons must be dialectically adequate. Only what Bodlović calls argumentative (i.e., 
dialectically adequate) reasons will be recognized by interlocutors as entitlement conferring, and 
as entitlement establishing for the commitment interlocutors take on as their own in accepting a 
proponent’s standpoint. 
A proponent is making a demand on others, that they recognize an entitlement and, thereby, 
to undertake a commitment. Yet, if a respondent is expected to take on a commitment, he too must 
be in a position to demonstrate his entitlement to that commitment (which is now his). Thus, in 
offering dialectically acceptable, “argumentative” reasons for claims, a proponent does not merely 
demonstrate her own entitlement to her commitments, she makes available those same entitlement-
establishing reasons that her opponent will be expected to have in undertaking a discursive 
commitment. That is, in giving dialectically adequate, “argumentative” reasons, a proponent helps 
her interlocutors to live up to their rational and argumentative responsibilities, by providing them 
with the entitlement-establishing reason they recognize as justifying their commitments. Thus, it 
is those who seek the endorsement by others of their commitments, those who expect that others 
should make changes in their own commitments who, in the first instance, bear dialectical burdens. 
Presumptions, whatever else they do, cannot function to short circuit any of this deontic 
machinery. Perhaps most importantly, presumptions ought not to compel commitment to claims to 
which we are otherwise not entitled. It is for this reason that the mere extra-discursive need to get 
on with things dialectically does not entitle us make any particular presumption. Rather, to secure 
entitlement to a presumption, like any other commitment, is to demonstrate one’s entitlement to 
that commitment in a dialectically adequate way. Dialectically independent inclinations about the 
relative plausibility of claims simply don’t pass argumentative muster. Only via dialectically 
adequate, “argumentative” reasons will entitlement be recognized by, and uptake secured among, 
one’s interlocutors. 
Yet, viewed in this way, it would seem that similar considerations apply to other changes 
one might seek to make in their commitment stores—specifically, withholding or retracting 
commitment. Relatedly, doubts can seem as though they do not stand in need of entitlement-
conferring reasons, because they seem to be the lack of a standpoint, rather than an endorsement 
or rejection of some claim. Yet, doubt is a cognitive attitude just as much as is belief. And the first-
person rational structure of doubt is analogous to that of belief. Moreover, withholding both assent 
and rejection is just as much a cognitive and discursive act as either accepting or denying. Indeed, 
many have argued that suspension of judgment is the epistemically proper standpoint in many 
circumstances—e.g., those characterized by an underdetermination or overdetermination of 
sufficient reasons. Assent and denial are relevant doxastic alternatives to suspension of judgment. 
Thus, it too is a cognitive attitude to which one can be committed, and entitled, and for which 
recognition and uptake can be sought. Further, once commitment to a claim is established, it may 
not coherently be withdrawn haphazardly, e.g., by inclination or fancy. Just as the haphazard 
adoption of beliefs is a rational pathology, so is the random abandonment of belief. Commitment 
adoption and retraction alike require retraining the coherence of one’s overall commitment store. 
So, when entitlement is claimed for withholding or retracting assent, this seems to be a 
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commitment like any other, and one that stands in need of reasons. Yet, if that’s correct, then those 
reasons cannot be purely explanatory. Rather they must be what Bodlović calls “argumentative” 
reasons. That is, they must be reasons that establish entitlements—i.e., reasons that are endorsed 
by others such that one’s entitlement to one’s standpoint is recognized and commitment to it on 
the part of one’s interlocutors is both permitted and obliged. 
To adopt such a view to argumentative discussions, whereby every discursive position is 
taken as a standpoint, is to view every critical discussion as a mixed dispute. Importantly, though, 
having adopted this approach, presumptions are not needed in remedying the putative discursive 
inequities and epistemic biases of “dialectical egalitarianism.” Rather, it seems that we must just 
be a bit more dialectically egalitarian than we have been to up until now. On this approach, no 
propositions are “dialectically privileged” such that “they do not require support until or unless the 
opponent presents sufficient reasons against their acceptability” (2). Because of this, we don’t run 
the risk of arbitrarily compel commitment to putatively “dialectically privileged” claims to which 
we are otherwise not entitled. Such a presumption-free approach to argumentative discussions 
seems to provide the same epistemic goods as “dialectical foundationalism” where our rules of 
reasonable discussion do “protect (epistemically) uncontroversial propositions and sanction 
(epistemically) deviant challenges” (2). As well, this more equitable approach to dialectically 
egalitarianism requires that the regress of reasons (4) end not at arbitrary, “presumptive” 
“dialectically privileged” stopping points, but at the bedrock of dialectical consensus which is the 
only dialectically sound ground on which resolution to disagreement can be built. 
